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THE FREE WILL DEFENSE AND DETERMINISM
James F. Sennett

Edward Wierenga has argued that the free will defense (FWD) is compatible
with compatibilism (Faith and Philosophy, April 1988). I maintain that
Wierenga is mistaken. I distinguish between the conceptual doctrine of compatibilism and the metaphysical doctrine of soft determinism, and offer arguments that the FWD fails if either doctrine is true. Finally, I reconstruct
Wierenga's argument and argue that it fails because either it is equivocal or
it contains a false premise.

Introduction

Edward Wierenga has charged Alvin Plantinga with hastiness in the latter's
concession that the free will defense (FWD) fails if compatibilism is true
([6], p. 216-see [4], pp. 44-47).1 The major requirement of the FWD is that
"if God causes someone else's action to occur it's not a free action." But this
is perfectly consistent with compatibilism, which is the thesis that "it's possible that all actions are both free and caused-caused, that is, by antecedent
conditions and not by the agent himself."2
The consistency of these two claims is seen when we understand that "not
just any cause is compatible with an action's being free; free actions have to
have the right kind of cause." That is, the agent's beliefs and desires must be
the principal causal elements, and these beliefs and desires must have arisen
in the proper ways. They must not have been artificially manipulated or
created. But this conception of free action entails that no one (hence, not even
God) could cause a given agent to perform a free action. Only his desires and
beliefs-properly formed and properly functioning-can cause him to do so.
Hence, since compatibilism and the FWD both entail the same crucial thesis-that God cannot cause an agent to perform a free action-they need not
be understood as being in conflict. As long as God does not cause the free
actions that cause the evil, there is room for the free will defense. Thus
Plantinga's concession that compatibilism defeats the FWD is unnecessary.
I contend that Wierenga is wrong, and that Plantinga's original misgivings
are essentially sound. 3
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I. Preliminary Matters

Determinism is the thesis that all events (including all actions) are causally
detennined to occur by past events. 4 The free will thesis is the thesis that there are
some free actions. The compatibilist thesis is the thesis that detenninism and the
free will thesis are compatible: it is possible that they both be true. Let us use 'D'
for the proposition All events are causally determined and 'F' for the proposition
There are some free actions. We may then construe the compatibilist thesis thus:
CT:

¢

CD

& F).

Plantinga notes the "the canny compatibilist" will argue not simply that D and Fare
compatible, but that an action is free only if it is detennined ([4], p. 46). Using "F*"
for the predicate is a free action and 'D*' for the predicate is causally determined,
we may then distinguish between a weak and a strong compatibilist thesis:
WCT (=CT): ¢ (D & F)

SCT: 0 (x) (F*x --+ D*X).5
I will deal primarily with WCT, and refer to it simply as CT.
The incompatibilist thesis is that F and D are inconsistent. That is (using
'--, D' for the proposition Some events are not causally determined),
IT:

0

(F

--+ --,

D).

Note that CT and IT are both theses about the logical relation of the concepts of
free action and causal detennination. Neither of these theses makes any assertions at all about the metaphysical structure of the actual world. That is, both are
consistent with D. They are also consistent with indeterminism, the thesis that
some events are not causally detennined (Le., --, D). (Throughout this paper, it
is assumed that if there are any undetennined events, they are actions. Questions
of indetenninism on a quantum level are bracketed for the sake of simplicity.)
In order for CT or IT to have metaphysical import, they must be coupled
with D or --, D. There are two such couplings that interest us here. First, there
is the libertarian thesis, which states that IT is true, and there are some free
actions. That is, 'F & 0 (F -> --, D): The second conjunct of this sentence is
inconsistent with CT. Assuming it would, therefore, beg the question against
the compatibilist from the start. I therefore present a weaker formulation of
the libertarian thesis for our purposes:
L: --, D & F. 6

I will show before the end of this paper, however, that a successful FWD
must entail not only L but the stronger formulation as well. Finally, there is
soft determinism, which is the claim that both D and F are true (and a fortiori,
CT is true). That is,
SD: D & F.
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A caveat is in order before going on. I do not pretend that L, CT, and SD
capture all the conceptual richness of the philosophical doctrines of libertarianism, compatibilism, and soft determinism. My formulations are, rather,
distillations of the crucial features of these doctrines that bear on the FWD.
Perhaps it is best to understand these formulae as entailed by the respective
doctrines, rather than as representative of them.

II. Plantinga's FWD
a. The Defense
Before discussing the bearing these distinctions have on Wierenga's claims,
we must say a few words about Plantinga's specific formulation of the FWD.
The FWD in general is the thesis that God is not responsible for the moral evil
in the world, since it has come about as a result of free actions by human agents.
Plantinga provides modal substance for this claim. He begins by noting that there
are some possible worlds that God could not have actualized ([3], pp. 169ft).
Consider a set of states of affairs {SI, S2, ... , Sn} such that its members are
all God actualizes in bringing about the actual world. Call this set T(W). If
there are free agents, then the actualization of T(W) does not determine that
any particular world will come about. Rather, there is a set of possible worlds
{WI, W2, ... WnJ? such that anyone of these worlds might be actualized as a
result of the actualization of TCW). Call this set the range of T(W).
Plantinga maintains that it is possible that the actual world (call it WI) is
only one of many possible worlds that could have been actualized as a result
of God's actualizing T(W). The crucial feature determining that WI be actual
rather than any other Wi is the set of free actions actually performed. For any
free action a performed by some agent J at a given time t, there are many
possible worlds in the range of T(W) that are identical to W I prior to t and
in which J refrains from performing a at t. Call one such world W2. WI and
W 2 both include T(W), but are not the same world. But it is not God's
responsibility that WI rather than W 2-or any other Wi in the range of T(W)is actualized. It is rather the responsibility of J (or other free moral agents).
Now, suppose WI contains more moral evil than W 2.1t was within 1's power
to actualize W2 rather than WI, but not within God's. God's power reaches
its limit at the actualization of T(W).8 Hence the moral responsibility for the
moral evil in WI rests not on God's shoulders, but on the shoulders of free
agents. God (alone) could not actualize WI or W 2 or any possible world
containing free actions ([3], p. 172).9
b. Plantinga's FWD and L
It can be shown that Planting must assume L to be true in the foregoing
development. Consider again time t, the time at which J performs a in W [.
If Plantinga's FWD is to work, then for any time t' prior to t, it must be
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possible, given the state of the world at t', both that J perform a at t and that
J refrain from performing a at t. That is, at no time prior to t can the state of
the world entail either that J perform a at t or that J refrain from performing

a at t. This can be the case only if T(W) does not include the state of affairs
All events in WI being causally determined to occur by events in WI.lO
If we use 'A' for the proposition, J pe rforms a at t, '-, A' for J refrains from
performing a at t, and 'Tg' for God actualizes T(W), then the above point
can be made by asserting that both of the following two propositions must
be true if Plantinga's FWD is to work:
JA: 0 (Tg & A)

and
J ---, A: 0 (Tg & ---, A). II

That is, the actualization of T(W) cannot be sufficient to determine whether
A or -, A is true in WI.
Now, suppose that D is true in WI. That is, one of the states of affairs included
in T(W) is All events in WI being causally determined by events in WI. It follows
that T(W) is sufficient to determine whether A or --, A is true. Since J's performing a at t is an event, either it or its complement will be ent;liled by T(W). So
one (and, of course, only one) of the following propositions is true:
(i) D

--+

0

(Tg

--+ ---,

A)

or
(ii) D

--+

0

(Tg

-+

A).

The consequents of (i) and (ii) are equivalent to the negations of JA and J --, A,
respectively.12 So, given that D is true, JA and J --, A cannot both be true. That
is,
(iii) D

-+ ---,

(JA & J ---, A).

Since Plantinga's FWD depends on JA and J --, A both being true, it depends on
determinism being false. Since the FWD (naturally) depends on there being free
actions, it follows that Plantinga's FWD presupposes L (--, D & F) to be true.

III. Contra Wierenga
Now we can return to Wierenga's contention that compatibilism is consistent with the FWD. It is not clear whether he is claiming that CT is compatible
with Plantinga's FWD, or just that it is possible to construct a FWD that is
compatible with CT. I wi\l assume that he means the latte~, and will proceed
to show that even this claim is false. I will make three points against
Wierenga. First, I wi1\ argue that it is not so much CT as SD that is of concern
to the free will defender, and SD is incompatible with the FWD. Second, I
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will argue that even the weaker notion CT is incompatible with the FWD.
Finally, in light of these arguments, I will show exactly where Wierenga's
argument that CT is compatible with the FWD is flawed-it is either equivocal or unsound.

a. SD and the FWD
It is not clear that CT as specified above is the sense of 'compatibilism'
that Plantinga is worried about when he states that the FWD is inconsistent
with compatibilism. Rather, it seems that he has conflated the possibility of
'D & F' with its actuality. For instance, he says, "[W]hat is at stake here,
fundamentally, is the conception of agent causation" ([4], p. 46). But agent
causation is inconsistent with SD, not CT. That it is possible that determinism
be true in no way entails that agent causation is actually false.
In fairness to Plantinga, I must point out that agent causation is also inconsistent with SCT (see page 341 above), which is actually what is bothering
Plantinga at this point. But SCT plus F entails SD-given the proviso that
all undetermined events are actions. Since the FWD depends on the assumption that F is true, concern over SCT for the free will defender reduces to
concern over SD.
So perhaps Plantinga is more concerned with SD than with CT. At any rate,
it does seem that it is SD that is really of interest to the free will defender.
That is, is it possible that: (i) all events are determined, and (ii) there are
some free actions, and (iii) the FWD successfully rebuts the argument from
evil? If Wierenga thinks that he has successfully defended this claim, then
he is mistaken.
Consider the following argument:
(1)
(2)

If God freely performs action A and knows that A will causally deter-

(3)

mine event B, then God is to some extent morally responsible for any
moral significance B might have.
God's actualizing T(W) was a free action.

(4)

Suppose that SD is true.

God is omniscient, and therefore knew that his actualizing T(W) would
causally determine that W I be actualized.

(5)

The actualization of W I entails the actualization of the evil there is.

(6)

Therefore, God is to some extent morally responsible for the evil that
there is.

(7)

If God is morally perfect, then he is in no way morally responsible for

(8)

Therefore, God is not morally perfect.

any evil.
The FWD is intended to show that God's moral perfection is compatible
with the evil in the world.
(10) Therefore, the FWD fails.

(9)
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(11) Therefore, if SD is true, the FWD fails.

This argument has seven premises: (1) - (5), (7), and (9). Of these, (1) is the
assumption for conditional proof, and is therefore above reproach. (3), (4),
and (7) are data of any FWD. That is, they are points of agreement (for the
sake of argument) between the problem of evil advocate and the free will
defender. To deny any of them would be, it seems, to deny the need for a
FWD. (5) is necessarily true, and (9) seems wholly unproblematic.
This leaves (2). The crucial question to be raised against (2) is: What reason
do we have to think that knowledge of causal determination entails some
moral responsibility? After all, double-effect counterexamples seem to
abound. A doctor can save a life-a good-only by amputating a limb-an
evil. The doctor knows that his actions will causally determine the loss of a
limb. But what sense can we make of the claim that he bears any moral
responsibility for the loss of the limb?
Perhaps the most effective way to defend premise (2) is to concede the
examples, but to argue that the import of such cases does not extend to God's
actions. Paramount in the double-effect scenario is the fact that the evil
caused is an unavoidable means to a greater good. Were there any other, less
morally costly way for the doctor to save the life, then he would be morally
responsible if he chose to amputate rather than to take the better alternative.
So an agent escapes moral responsibility for an evil event causally determined
by his free action only if the evil was an unavoidable means to a greater
good-only if, that is, the evil was justified in the strong sense that it contributed to a greater good and was the only means (or a necessary condition
for the only means) to that good.
Let us look at the situation somewhat more formally. The doctor in our
double-effect example above has two choices: (i) he amputates; or (ii) he
does not amputate. The claim before us is
(12) The doctor bears no moral responsibility for any evil determined by (i)
only if
(A)
there is some state of affairs S such that (i) causally determines
S;and
(B)
there is no state of affairs S* such that
(a)S* includes (ii);
(b)it is in the doctor's power to actualize S* or to causally determine that S* be actualized;
(c)there is some state of affairs S** such that
(a) S* causally determines S**; and
(13) S** is morally preferable to S (i.e., S** contains a balance
of moral good over moral evil preferable to that of S); and
(d)the doctor knows that (b) and (c).
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The general principle underlying (12) can be specified to God's actualization
of T(W) (allowing for certain entailments given that worlds are maximally
consistent states of affairs) thus:
(13) God bears no moral responsible for the evil determined by his actualizing T(W) only if WI (causally determined by the actualization ofT(W)
is such that there is no W* such that
(a) it is in God's power to actualize W* or to causally determine that
W* be actualized l3 ;
(b) W* is morally preferable to W I (i.e., W* contains a balance of moral
good over moral evil preferable to that of WI); and
(c) God knows that (a) and (b).

Given God's omniscience, condition (c) is met trivially for any world in
which (a) and (b) are true. W* meets conditions (a) and (b) of (13) just in
case it is an SD world and it is a morally better world than W 1.14 Since (13)
claims that God is not morally responsible for the evil in WI only if there is
no world meeting conditions (a) and (b), it follows that God is not morally
responsible for the evil in W I only if there is no SD world morally preferable
to WI. Hence, if all events are causally determined, God is morally justified
in actualizing T(W) only if WI is the best possible world in which SD is
true. IS
But obviously this is not the case. Consider two counterexamples, one very
modest, the other very extreme. The first is a world as close to WI as possible,
except that Ted Bundy never commits any of the horrible evils he actually
committed. Certainly such a world is better-however minutely-than the
actual one. If both are worlds in which SD is true, then both are worlds God
could have causally determined while preserving human freedom. The extreme case is one reminiscent of John Mackie's classic objection to the FWD.
Mackie asked why God did not create only those free moral agents whom he
knew would always freely choose to do good ([1], pp. 56f). In the present
context we can ask, why did God not actualize a world in which SD is true
and the causal chains are such that all free moral agents are determined freely
to choose only the good?
Here it is crucial to note that Plantinga's FWD is a direct response to
Mackie's objection ([2], pp. 135-49; [3], pp. 167-68). So it is no mistake that
Plantinga's FWD requires that L be true. He argues that it might not be
possible for God to create free moral agents that freely choose only the
good-or even that freely choose to actualize more good and less evil than
is in WI. What these free creatures do is ultimately up to them, not up to God.
But if SD is true, then what they freely do is ultimately up to God.
The libertarian can be content that this is not the best possible world in
which L is true. However, a soft determinist who wishes to construct a FWD
is saddled with the enormous task of arguing that this is the best of all possible
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SD worlds. In light of the above plausible counterexamples, I cannot see how
this task could be accomplished. Hence, I believe that (2) is true, and the
argument against an SD-FWD is sound.
Why, then, does (2) speak only of God's being "to some extent morally
responsible" for B? Why not, in light of the above development, simply
charge that all blame for evil is his? To do so would be to beg the question
against the soft determinist, who typically claims that the fact of determinism
does not absolve an agent from moral blameworthiness or exclude her from
moral praiseworthiness. (2) is worded as it is in order to make room for
responsibility for evil on the part of other agents besides God. If J freely
performs a (in the SD sense), then J may be to some extent morally responsible for any evil a causes, so God is not wholly to blame. But, as (7) points
out, any moral responsibility would be inconsistent with God's moral perfection. In order for the FWD to work, God must be exonerated from all blameworthiness for evil. If SD is true, he is not so exonerated. 16
b. CT and the FWD
So even if CT is compatible with the FWD, SD is not, and it is SD that is
actually of concern to the free will defender. But the previous argument can
help us see that even CT, as weak as it is, is also incompatible with a successful FWD.17
Suppose that the following three propositions are true:
(14) ¢ (D & F) [=CT)
(15) ..., (D & F)

(16) There is a possible world W* such that (D & F) is true in W* and W*
contains less evil than WI.

It follows from these propositions that God need not have permitted all the

evil there is, since he could have had both free will and causally determined
actions. If CT is true in WI, then there are worlds in which SD is true. (16)
asserts that at least one SD world has less evil than WI (consider, for example,
the Mackie SD world discussed in the previous section). Therefore, God
needed simply to have actualized the appropriate states of affairs so as to
causally determine such a world. God could have created a world in which
there are free creatures and less evil than WI, but he did not. Therefore, God
seems again to be in some way responsible at least that there is the amount
of evil that there is, in much the same way that he is if SD is true. CT, like
SD, is incompatible with a FWD alleviation of such divine blame. If (14) (16) are all true, then even compatibilism in the very weak form CT is
incompatible with the FWD (note that (16) is necessarily true if true at all).
Notice that I have now shown what I promised to show early in the
paper. Since even CT is incompatible with the FWD, a successful FWD
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must assume not just L, but the stronger formulation of libertarianism
given above: 'F & D (F -+ --, D).' If it is even possible that'D & F' be true,
then the FWD fails. IS
c. Wierenga on CT and the FWD

But what of Wierenga's argument that causal determinism is consistent
with the claim that free actions are not caused by God, and that this latter
claim is all the FWD needs? Where did it go wrong? Our previous discussions
put us in a position to see its shortcomings.
I understand Wierenga's argument to be:
(17) Causal detenninism is compatible with the claim that no free action is
caused by God.
(IS) The proposition No free action is caused by God entails that the FWD
is successful. 19
(19) Therefore, causal detenninism is compatible with the FWD.20

Either this argument is equivocal or it contains a false premise. The sense of
'caused by God' that the FWD needs to succeed is not 'proximately or
appropriately caused,' or 'caused in a way incompatible with free will.' As
we saw above, the FWD also requires that God not cause actions in such a
way that he bears any moral responsibility for any evil resulting from the
action. But, as we have seen, the compatibilist sense of 'caused' is consistent
with God's being so responsible to some extent, even though he does not
interfere with the compatibilist freedom of any agents.
If 'caused by God' in (17) and (18) above means only 'proximately or
appropriately caused,' -that is, 'caused in a way incompatible with free
wiIl'-then (18) is equivalent to
(IS*)The proposition No free action is caused by God in a way that is
incompatible with its being a free action entails that the FWD is successful.

We have seen that the FWD fails unless God is absolved of all moral responsibility evil. Yet the two arguments above show that if either SD or CT is true,
God bears some moral responsibility. Since the proposition in italics in (18*) is
compatible with SD and CT, it cannot entail the success of the FWD, since both
SD and CT entail that the FWD fails. 21 Hence, if 'caused by God' is read simply
as 'caused in a way incompatible with its being a free action,' then (18) is false.
On the other hand, if 'caused by God' in (17) and (18) is read as 'caused
in such a way that God, and not just the agent, bears some moral responsibility
for any evil resulting from the action,' then (17) is equivalent to
(17*) Causal detenninism is compatible with the claim that no free action is
caused in such a way that God bears some moral responsibility for any
evil resulting from the action.
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The arguments above show that, given either CT or SD, God's actualizing
T(W) is sufficient to make him morally responsible to some extent for the
evil that there is. (17*) entails the denial of such sufficiency, and is therefore
false. Hence, if we take the second reading of 'caused by God,' then (17) is
false.
The only way to get two true premises to Wierenga's argument is to interpret 'caused by God' in (17) as 'caused in a way incompatible with free will'
and in (18) as 'caused in such a way that God is to some extent morally
responsible for any evil resulting from the action.' But then, of course, the
argument is equivocal and invalid.

Conclusion
Plantinga is right to be concerned with the incompatibility of SD (or even
CT) and the FWD. The truth of either of these propositions entails that the
FWD will not relieve God from at least some moral responsibility for some
evil. And Wierenga's defense of the compatibility of compatibilism and the
FWD does nothing to alleviate this concern.
But Plantinga and other free will defenders need not despair. It is by no
means a foregone conclusion that CT, SD, or even D is true. There are still
many libertarians alive and well, and even the plethora of soft determinists
and compatibilists permeating the philosophical ranks today lacks anything
by way of a conclusive argument. 22 Given the undecided nature of these
theses, the libertarian view is still epistemically possible. Apparently it is
possible that one be rational in accepting libertarianism in the strong or weak
senses explicated, and hence in rejecting SD or even CT. Since Plantinga
intends the FWD to be a tool in establishing the rationality of theistic belief,
it may still stand as a successful rebuttal of the argument from evil, even if
SD or CT is true. All that is required is that one be rational in believing them
to be false. 23
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NOTES
1. All quotations of Wierenga in this and the following paragraph are from page 216 of
[4]. All italics are his.
2. As stated, Wierenga's formulation of compatibilism may be too strong. The compatibilist need not claim that it is possible that all actions be both free and caused, but
only that some actions be both. It is the incompatibilist thesis-that no free action is caused
(or, more accurately, causally determined)-that is the stronger position. See the discussion of these theses later in the paper. See also note 5 below.
3. Plantinga has related to me in conversation that he is impressed with Wierenga's
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point, and has decided he was wrong to see compatibilism and the FWD to be incompatible. If I am right, then Plantinga is in the enviable position of the mythical professor who
claimed he was only wrong once-when he thought he was mistaken about something,
but it turned out he was not!
4. The question of whether or not facts or states of affairs can be causal factors will be
bracketed for sake of simplicity. Por those worried about such matters, the definition of
determinism can simply be amended to read "the thesis that all events are causally
determined to occur by past events and facts."
5. Note that CT as here construed (WCT) is Wierenga's formulation, and not the weaker
thesis alluded to in note 2 above. Hence, there is a third possibility-a still weaker
compatibilist thesis:
SWCT: 0 (3 x)(P*x & D*x).
I retain CT - Wierenga's formulation-for simplicity. Since CT is compatible with L (see
below), I need not worry about SWCT (which is a fortiori compatible with L).
6. A more accurate characterization would be 'P & (P ...... -, D),' which is, of course,
equivalent to '-, D & F.' And, given the assumption that all undetermined events are free
actions, the two formulations have the same philosophical import. I retain the more explicit
latter characterization for simplicity.
A further notion, which is not crucial to the current discussion is hard determinism, the
thesis that IT is true and D is true-that is,
D & 0 (P -+ -, D).
The weaker formulation, parallel to L and compatible with CT, would be
D&-,F.
7. The set may be infinite (i.e., {W 1> W2, ... ), but this is irrelevant to the present point.

8. Plantinga argues in [3] that this thesis is compatible with God's omnipotence.
9. Plantinga distinguishes between weak and strong actualization. God strongly actualizes a state of affairs S just in case God's action is sufficient to bring about S. God weakly
actualizes S just in case God's action alone is not sufficient to bring about S, but God's
action plus the free action of some other agent (or agents) is sufficient to bring about S.
Thus God strongly actualizes T(W) and weakly actualizes WI'
10. Technically, since WI is a set of states of affairs (as are all possible worlds for
Plantinga), it includes no events at all. The state of affairs that T(W) must exclude is
actually something like All events described in propositions whose correspondillg states
of affairs are members of WI being causally determilled to occur by other evellts described
by propositions whose correspondillg states of affairs are members of WI. I retain the
shorthand version in the text, sacrificing accuracy for simplicity. The idea, I think, is not
as difficult to grasp as is its exact expression to formulate. So also with several other
intuitive but technically inaccurate statements regarding possible worlds in this paper.
11. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy for these formulations
of JA and J -, A, which are marked improvements over previous formulations of mine.
12. Re.: the negation of JA:
-,0 (Tg & A) .....

0 -, (Tg & A) ..... 0 (Tg

-+ -,

A).
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Re.: the negation of J -, A:
-, 0 (Tg & -, A) ..... D -, (Tg & -, A) +-+ D (Tg -+ A).
13. This is, of course, strong actualization (see note 9 above).
14. I claim that W* must be an SD world rather than simply a D world on the assumption
that one world can be morally preferable to another only if it is a world with free actions
for which agents are morally responsible. Even if my assumption is false, however, no
harm is done. Condition (a) of (13) entails that W* is a D world. Since all SD worlds are
D worlds, my assumption actually strengthens the requirement for W* if anything. I show
in the following text that there are SD worlds meeting conditions (a) and (b), so my point
succeeds even if one believes that it is possible that a world be deterministic, void of free
actions, and morally better than WI.
15. I do not say simply "best possible world," because if L is possibly true, then there
may be some possible worlds better than the actual world, but such that L is true in those
worlds and they are worlds such that the relevant free moral agents would choose not to
actualize them. These would be possible worlds that God could not actualize, since he
would need assistance of libertarian free creatures that would not be forthcoming. So there
could be possible worlds better than the actual world such that God could not actualize
those worlds (and hence is not responsible for not actualizing them)-but none of them
would be SD worlds.
16. For the sake of simplicity I am understanding moral responsibility to be equivalent
to moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. This is a far too simple and perhaps
misleading assumption. Exploration of the distinctions would take us too far afield,
however, and I do not see that it would be particularly helpful in adjudicating my claims.
William Barrett has asked whether or not there is a paradoxical shift implicit in this
argument, in that the question of God's moral responsibility in the actualization of T(W)
is a reversion back to the notion of libertarian freedom. That is, am I not assuming that
God's actualizing of T(W) was free in the libertarian sense, and it is only by assuming
such that I am able to find him morally culpable? While I believe that God's free actions
are free in the libertarian sense (as I believe all free actions to be), my assumption of his
culpability in the actualizing of T(W) is not dependent on this. The general principle of
moral responsibility underlying (12) and (13) is neutral to the question of whether the
freedom involved is libertarian or compatibilistic. I believe it is a true principle of moral
responsibility even if the SD sense of freedom is the correct one. It is not that God is a
libertarian free agent (whether or not we are) that makes him guilty for the evil in WI
given (13). He is guilty by a principle of moral responsibility that holds even in SD worlds.
17. I am grateful to Patrick Francken for the following argument.
18. There are actually two possible scenarios under which a CT-FWD might be thought
to work. The first is to claim that SD freedom, even if possible, would be inferior to L
freedom to the point that any L world, just on the strength of its merit as an L world,
would be better than any SD world. The second is to claim that there are SD worlds, and
even SD worlds such that the balance of good over evil in them is preferable to WI.
However, every SD world is one in which God does not exist, hence is a world which
God could not actualize. This latter argument is tantamount to the claim that it is
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necessarily true that, if God actualizes a world with human freedom, such freedom is
libertarian-a claim I see little difficulty in endorsing.
My only response to these two cases is that, if we grant either starting point (that all L
worlds are better than all SD worlds, or that God actualizes no SD world), there seems to
be no motivation for a CT-FWD at all, since each of these cases entails that W \ is an L
world (given the FWD provisos that W \ is an F world and that God is morally perfect).
It seems that the strength of a CT-FWD would be in its power to show that, even if WI
were an SD world, the FWD would still be successful in W \. Both cases above entail that
this is false, and hence gut the force of the CT-FWD. That is, both arguments entail that
the FWD fails in any SD world with moral evil. By contrast, I suggest that a CT-FWD is
successful only if it entails (a) that there is at least one SD world in which the FWD is
successful and (b) for all we know, WI is just such a world. Under such an assumption,
the two arguments above fail as CT-FWD's. At the very least, I want to claim that a
CT-FWD is philosophically and theologically interesting only if it meets these two
conditions.
I am grateful to Vic Reppert for the latter case, and to Hugh Chandler for the former
(who, in tum, credits it to St. Anselm-though he did not, I assume, learn of it through
personal conversation).
19. Given other premises not in question here; e.g., "God is morally responsible for
moral evil only ifhe causes the free actions that cause the evil"; and "The FWD succeeds
if it shows that God is not morally responsible for moral evil."
20. If P is compatible with Q, and Q entails R, then P is compatible with R.
21. If P entails ~ Q and R is compatible with p, then R cannot entail Q.
22. For a very fine recent defense of libertarianism, see Peter van Inwagen, An Essay
on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
23. Many acknowledgements must be made for this paper's achieving its final form.
First, I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga, Joe Mendola, and Patrick Francken for helpful
discussions leading to its original formulation. Second, I thank Dave Reiter for insightful
comments on two earlier versions. Third, I offer thanks to the participants of the lith
annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois in April 1989, before
whom a version was read, with special thanks to William Barrett for thoughtful prepared
comments. I am especially grateful to Barrett for a colorful and accurate condensation of
the paper's thesis: an "analysis of the viability of the free will defense ... in view of Edward
Wierenga's claim that compatibilism is in fact compatible with the kind of free will that
makes the free will defense defensible." Finally, thanks are due to William Alston and to
two anonymous Faith and Philosophy referees, who offered penetrating comments on an
earlier version.
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